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Consider an agent that must choose to interact with one of several groups. It
may be a ﬁrm deciding which foreign market to enter or a lawyer weighing
the pros and cons of entering into a partnership with diﬀerent potential
candidate ﬁrms. In many such situations, the eventual payoﬀ of the agent is
the outcome of a strategic interaction that unfolds following her choice. Non-
cooperative game theory oﬀers a potent framework to phrase (and answer)
such questions, provided the rules of the game properly speciﬁed and players
know them.
Knowledge of the rules is sometimes a valid assumption, especially if the
conﬂict situation is embedded within a well deﬁned legal framework. At
other times however, players get to know the rules only when they are al-
ready in the conﬂict situation or perhaps learn them after repeated play. But
often, as experiences with experimental subjects show, even when informed
of the rules, individuals ﬁnd it diﬃcult to understand them immediately.
The question is then, how are consistent choices among strategic situations
made without a complete knowledge of the rules at the time of making the
choice.
Note that it is also not enough to assume approximate knowledge of the rules.
For, it is well known that equilibrium outcomes (and payoﬀs) in a game are
very sensitive to the precise speciﬁcation of the rules of play: intuitively small
changes to the extensive form can lead to substantial changes in equilibrium
payoﬀs. Therefore, if one assumes that individuals make consistent choices,
it is important to understand how a decision maker might form an ex-ante
evaluation of a conﬂict situation. This paper is a contribution towards such
an understanding.
To begin, how might one formally represent a strategic situation? Indeed,
is it not the rules that determine the strategic content of any conﬂict. If
so, one cannot speak of a strategic situation under ignorance of the rules!
Nevertheless, we contend that it is sometimes possible to speak of strategic
interaction even without knowing the rules. Indeed, suppose that we specify
a set of players and the size of the pie that the players can share if they strike
a bargain. That would then be a description of a conﬂict situation even
though the bargaining process that determines the individual allocation of
the pie remains unspeciﬁed.
2In fact, in this paper, we take the view that a game in coalition form can
adequately represent the unstructured interaction between the players. A
coalition form game consists of a ﬁnite set of players, say N and a real
valued function, say f, whose value f(S) at a coalition S ⊆ N is the total
surplus that players in S can avail for themselves should they come to an
agreement. In other words, a coalition form speciﬁes what it is feasible
for diﬀerent players but does not specify the process for arriving at the
individual allocations.
In the model we consider in the next section, a decision maker (DM) must
choose from m “actions”. If she chooses the action i ∈ {1,...,m}, the
“consequence” is a coalition from game fi over a ﬁxed set of players Ni∪{d}
(where d stands for the DM). In what follows, we refer to fi as a “strategic
situation” and not a TU game since in our interpretation, the rules are not
speciﬁed. At the time of making her choice, she is fully aware of the proﬁle
of SS, denoted by F = (f1,...,fm) – which we shall refer to as a choice
situation. Let G denote a set of choice situations.
Taking G as a given, the DM is fully described by a mapping F 7−→ C (F)
where C (F) ⊆ {1,...,m}. Interpret i ∈ C (F) but j / ∈ C (F) to mean that
“the DM likes the prospect of being in the strategic situation
fi to the prospect of being in the strategic situation fj”.
The methodology of this paper involves studying properties of C (·) under
a set of axioms.
In Section 2, allowing F to vary over a suﬃciently rich set, a relatively mild
set of axioms are enough to show, for each i, the existence of a “utility
function” θi (·) such that i ∈ C (F) if and only if θi (fi) ≥ θj (fj) for all F.
This representation of C(·) is essentially Theorem 1. θi(fi) may be regarded
as the “ex-ante utility of playing the game fi” – it is ex-ante since the DM
is ignorant of the rules of the game.
It should be noted that the original motivation of the Shapley Value is
that of an ex-ante evaluation of playing a game. Indeed, in the seminal
contribution, Shapley (1953), it is asserted that
“At the foundation of the theory of games is the assumption
that players ... can evaluate in their own utility scales, every
“prospect” that might arise as a result of play ... To apply
3the theory to any ﬁeld, one would normally expect ... to
include in the class of “prospects” the prospect of having to
play a game ...
... “the value is best regarded as an a priori assessment
of the situation based on either ignorance or disregard ... of
the social organization ...”
– Shapley (1953)
Yet, neither the spirit of the original construction nor any of the subsequent
axiomatizations (see Roth (1977) and Agastya (1996) however) allow one
to attribute the verbal motivation suggested by Shapley to the Value.
The framework outlined above on the other hand, is ﬁrmly entrenched in
the standard decision theoretic methodology familiar in Economic theory:
there is one DM who has to choose from a list of possibilities and axioms are
placed on her choice as this list varies. Therefore our framework allows for an
investigation of the Shapely Value in line with the original motivation: the
term “a priori evaluation” is an evaluation of the strategic situation based
on “ignorance ... of the social organization”, i.e. an ignorance of the rules of
conﬂict. A further purpose of this paper is therefore to exhibit conditions by
which the function θi(·) can be related to the Shapley Value. The importance
of this exercise is underscored through the widespread use of Shapley Value
as a solution concept in cooperative game theory and Economics2.
With the above discussion in mind, in Section 3 we ﬁrst introduce the
“marginality principle”. We say that C(·) is based on the marginality princi-
ple if θi(·) is a linear combination of the marginal contributions of the DM to
various coalitions in Ni. Recall that when C(·) is based the Shapley Value,
then it certainly satisﬁes the marginality principle, but there can be many
others. Theorem 2 characterizes C(·) that satisfy the marginality principle
through an axiom that we label as “Strategic Equivalence”. A further axiom
“Consistency” is then shown to be necessary and suﬃcient for C(·) to based
on the Shapley Value. This is Theorem 3.
Section 4 contains a brief discussion of the generality of the above results
and concludes the paper.
2Hart and Moore (1990) use Shapley Value as the allocation rule within a ﬁrm. Stole
and Zwiebel (1996) show how intraﬁrm bargaining can lead to this allocation rule. It is
a central concept in the cost allocation literature.(See the references in Young (1988) for
example, which also contains an alternative axiomatization of the value.)
4Before we turn to the formal details, we draw the reader’s attention to
two related papers, namely Agastya (1996) and Roth (1977). This work
shares its motivation with Agastya (1996) and certain insights from that
construction. However, the framework of analysis is diﬀerent. Here we deal
with choice functions. There, n preference relations over the set of n player
super-additive TU games are studied. Each of these preference relations
correspond to the n roles that an individual may come to be in n player
TU. Axioms are imposed that draw on the links between these preference
relations and proves various representation theorems. Roth (1977) has a
diﬀerent motivation but can formally be regarded as the model in Agastya
(1996) but one that requires lottery mixtures over games to conduct its
analysis.
2. The Model
For i = 1...,m, Ni is a group consisting of ni players, other than the
Decision Maker (DM). The DM has to choose to play a game involving
exactly one of these groups. As articulated in the introduction, the “game”
involving Ni is given by a real valued function fi deﬁned on 2Ni∪{d} \∅. We
shall refer to fi as a strategic situation (SS) involving Ni (and the DM).
It is a strategic situation and not a game because no rules are speciﬁed.
Let Gi be a set of SS over Ni and G = G1 × ··· × Gm. As discussed
in the Introduction, the DM is fully described by a choice correspondence
C : G 7−→ {1,...,m}. The theory of choice to be developed in the sequel
involves characterizations of C (·) based on some axioms.
Observe that each fi is in fact a 2ni −1 dimensional vector and therefore, in
general, Gi is some subset of R2ni−1. Here, we assume G = R2ni−1
+ so that
fi(S) ≥ 0 for all non-empty S ⊆ Ni ∪ {d} although much of the analysis
to follow can be generalized when Gi is a convex cone (of super-additive
fi). αfi, the scalar multiplication of fi ∈ Gi, α ∈ R and the addition of
fi,f0
i ∈ Gi are well deﬁned concepts. We also assume throughout that C (·)
is continuous in the sense that for every inﬁnite sequence {Fk} ⊆ G,

i ∈ C (Fk) ∀k ∧ lim
k→∞
Fk = F∗

⇒ i ∈ C (F∗)
It is important to remark that the analysis to follow assumes that C(F) 6= ∅
for all F. In other words, the DM prefers choosing to engage in one of the
5strategic situations to the status quo. It will be evident to the reader that
this is not an important restriction. If such an assumption were not made,
the Axioms to follow can be assumed to hold in the event the DM chooses
not to remain in the status quo. As to when it is optimal not to remain in
the status quo can then be deduced separately.
Deﬁne δ∗
i ∈ Gi as
δ∗
i (S) =
(
1 if d ∈ S
0 otherwise.
S ⊆ Ni ∪ {d},S 6= ∅ (1)
In the SS αδ∗
i , the DM is uniquely responsible for the surplus of α. If the
consequence of the DM’s action were to be αδ∗
i , it appears reasonable for the
DM to expect to get α. Our ﬁrst axiom embodies this intuition together with
the implicit assumption that a unit of “utile” received in a SS interaction
from Ni translates to a unit of “utile” received in a SS over Nj.
Axiom 1 (Comparability). Suppose F = (α1δ∗
1,...,αnδ∗
m). for some scalars
αi ≥ 0 for i = 1,...,m. Then i ∈ C (F) if and only if αi ≥ αj for all
j = 1,...m.
Axiom 2 (Scale Invariance). C (λF) = C (F) for all λ > 0 and F ∈ G.
Axiom 2 may be thought of in two ways. First, just as in Nash (1950),
we might think of the worth of a coalition as the combined vNM utility
from some underlying outcome. Since the vNM utility functional is unique
only up to an aﬃne transformation, F and λF represent the same strategic
environments. Alternatively, one may simply view the Axiom as a heuristic
procedure by an agent of limited rationality that seeks to simplify the choice
problem into forming simple equivalence classes.
Deﬁnition 1 (Revealed Preference and Equivalance of SS). F−i ∈ G−i is
said to reveal that fi ∈ Gi is preferred to f0
i ∈ Gi if i ∈ C(fi,F−i) and
i / ∈ C(f0
i,F−i).
fi is equivalent to f0
i if one cannot be revealed preferred to the other by any
Fi ∈ G−i.
Note that it is plausible that fi is revealed preferred to f0
i by F−i while the
opposite is true at some other F0
−i. This might for example happen if two
diﬀerent groups correspond to ﬁrms which ultimately interact in the same
6product market. Axiom 3 and Axiom 4 below are based on the hypothesis
that choosing i is mutually exclusive of anything that might happen in from
the game involving Nj and thus rule out above mentioned possibilities. To
exposition, ﬁrst introduce the notation i and ∼i where
fi i f0
i ⇔ ∃ F−i that reveals fi is preferred to f0
i and (2)
fi ∼i f0
i ⇔ fi is equivalent to F0
i. (3)
Axiom 3 (Group Independence). For each i = 1,...m and there does not
exist a sequence f1
i ,...,fk+1
i in Gi such that fk+1
i = f1
i and
f1
i i f2
i i ··· i fk+1
i .
Axiom 4 (Equivalence). Let F = (f1,...,fm) and F0 = (f0
1,...,f0
m) be
such that fi ∼i f0
i for all i = 1,...,m. Then C (F) = C (F0).
It is worth pointing out that Axiom 4 is a separate condition and not a
consequence of the deﬁnition of ∼i. For example, (assuming m = 2),
without the above Axiom, it is impossible to conclude from fi ∼ f0
i that
j ∈ C(fi,fj) ⇒ j ∈ C(f0
i,fj) for a j 6= i. Axiom 4 plays a key role in all our
results.
Deﬁnition 2 (Null Player). The DM is said to a null player in fi if
fi (S ∪ d) = f (S) for all S ⊆ Ni, S 6= ∅ and fi (d) = 0.
Let Ni denote the set of all fi ∈ Gi in which the DM is a null player.
As a null player, the DM does not contribute to any coalition nor does
she achieve anything on her own. The next axiom is (a mild form of) the
assertion that a DM would prefer being in a SS in which she is essential for
generation of surplus in at least one coalition to being a null player.
Axiom 5 (Nullity). Suppose F = (f1,...,fn) is such that fi ∈ Ni and
i ∈ C (F), then fj ∈ Nj for all j and C (F) = {1,...,m}.
It is worth pointing out Axiom 5 does not play an essential role in Theorem
1 although it is important for the results of Section 3 and Section 4. For
Theorem 1 below, it would suﬃce to assume that for each i there exist F
and F0 such that i ∈ C(F) but i / ∈ C(F0). It does play a crucial role for our
remaining results and therefore we impose it at the outset.
Theorem 1. The following statements are equivalent:
7(1) C (·) satisﬁes Axiom 1 – Axiom5.
(2) For i = 1,...,m, there exist a continuous θi : Gi −→ R that is a).
θi(δ∗
i ) = 1, b). θi(fi) = 0 if fi ∈ Ni, c). homogenous of degree one
and c). for all F ∈ G,
i ∈ C (F) ⇔ θi (fi) ≥ θj (fj) ∀j (4)
For the sake of clarity, we collect some of the arguments used in the proof
Theorem 1 in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, the following hold:
(1) i is complete, transitive and continuous.
(2) If the DM is a null player in f0
i but not in fi, then fi i f0
i.
(3) If the DM is a null player in fi and f0
i, then fi ∼i f0
i.
(4) i is homothetic, i.e. fi  f0
i ⇔ λfi i λf0
i for all λ > 0.
Proof of the above Lemma is given after the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. That (2) ⇒ (1) is clear. We will not prove the converse.
By Lemma 1, i is a continuous, complete and transitive preference relation
on the non-negative orthant of an Euclidean space. Therefore it admits a
continuous utility representation Ui(·). Due to Part 3, Lemma 1 we can
choose the normalization that Ui(fi) = 0 for any fi ∈ Ni. By Part 2,
Ui(fi) > 0 whenever fi ∈ Gi \ Ni and in particular, Ui(δ∗
i ) > 0.
By Part 4 of Lemma 1, Ui(·) may be assumed to be homogeneous of degree
one. Setting θi(fi) = Ui(fi)/Ui(δ∗
i ), we have
Ui(fi) = θi(fi)Ui(δ∗
i )
= Ui(θi (fi)δ∗
i )
and therefore
fi ∼i θi(fi)δ∗
i (5)
Given F = (f1,...,fm) let F∗ = (θ1(f1)δ∗
1,...,θn(fn)δ∗
n). By Axiom 4,
C(F) = C(F∗). Conclude by Axiom 1 that i ∈ C(F) if and only if θi(fi) ≥
θj(fj) for all j. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Proof of Part 1: Continuity of i follows directly from
the continuity of C (·). Completeness is also immediate. To complete the
8proof Part 1, it remains to verify that i is transitive. There are essentially
three cases to consider.
fi ∼i f0
i ∧ f0
i ∼ f00
i ⇒ fi ∼i f00
i (6)
fi i f0
i ∧ f0
i ∼ f00
i ⇒ fi i f00
i (7)
fi i f0
i ∧ f0
i  f00
i ⇒ fi i f00
i (8)
Suppose (6). Then C (fi,F−i) = C (f0
i,F−i) = C (f00
i ,F−i) for all F−i.
Therefore fi ∼i f00
i follows immediately. Next suppose (7). By deﬁnition,
there exists a F−i such that i ∈ C (fi,Fi) and i / ∈ C (f0
i,F−i). But since
f0
i ∼i f00
i , C (f00
i ,F−i) = C (f0
i,F−i) and as a consequence i / ∈ C (f00
i ,F−i).
Consequently, fi i f00
i . Finally, assume (8). Assume by way of contradic-
tion that either fi ∼i f00
i or f00
i i fi. If the former is the case, this is as in (7)
and leads to the contradictory implication that f0
i i fi. On the other hand
if the latter is the case, the cyclical sequence fi,f0
i,f00
i ,fi violates Axiom 3.
Proof of Part 2: Let fε
j be a SS over Nj in which the DM is not a null player
for every ε > 0 but limε→0 fε
j = f∗
j is a SS in which the DM is indeed a null
player. By Axiom 5, we have the following:
C
 
fi,f∗
j ,F−i

= {i}
C
 
fi,fε
j,F−i

⊆ {i,j} ∀ε > 0
C
 
f0
i,fε
j,F−i

= {j} ∀ ε > 0
It is clear from the above, that in order to satisfy continuity, for all ε suﬃ-
ciently small, C

fi,fε
j,F−i

= {i}. Therefore, fi i f0
i.
Proof of Part 3: If F−i is such that d is null in each fj, then C(fi,F−i) =
C(f0
i,F−i) = {1,...,m} for all i ∈ {1,...,m}. Suppose fi,f0
i are both null
for d. Suppose i ∈ C (F). Then by Axiom 5, C (F) = {1,...,m} and d is
null in every fj for all j = 1,...,m. At F0 = (f0
i,F−i) it is still the case, by
Axiom 5, that C (F0) = {1,...,m}. Therefore, fi ∼ f0
i.
Proof of Part 4: This is an immediate implication of Axiom 2 and Axiom 3.

93. Rules based on the Marginality Principle
The marginal contribution of the DM to a coalition S ⊆ Ni ∪ {d} in fi is
[fi(S) − fi(S \ {d})]. In Theorem 1, we have shown that axioms placed on
C (·) are enough for the DM to calculate the “utility” of each of the SSs
in a given CS and then pick the one that oﬀers the highest “utility”. Our
objective in this section is to suggest conditions under which the “utility”
is based only on the marginal contributions.
Deﬁnition 3 (Marginality Principle). The choice rule C (·) is said to be
based on the marginality principle if for each i ∈ {1,...,m}, there exists a
pi : 2Ni\∅ −→ R such that i ∈ C (F) ⇔ θi (fi) ≥ θj (fj) where
θi (fi) =
X
S⊆Ni
pi (S)[fi (S ∪ {d}) − fi (S)] (9)
and θi(δ∗
i ) = 1.
To introduce the next axiom, we deﬁne a special class of SS in Gi. Given
S ⊆ Ni ∪ {d}, let δS ∈ Gi be such that for each T ⊆ Ni ∪ {d},
δS (T) =
(
1 if T ⊆ S
0 otherwise,
Given S ⊆ Ni, fi + αδS is the SS in which the coalition S is uniquely
responsible for an additional α units of output relative to fi. When fi ∼i f0
i,
it means the DM is unable to distinguish between them. The next axiom
says that an identical improvement the “productivity” of a coalition S in
both fi and f0
i will not enable the DM to distinguish between them.
Axiom 6 (Strategic Equivalence). Let fi,f0
i ∈ Gi be such that i ∈ C (fi,F−i) ⇔
i ∈ C (f0
i,F−i) for all F−i ∈ G−i. Then, i ∈ C (fi,F−i) ⇔ i ∈ C (f0
i,F−i)
for every S ⊆ Ni ∪ {d} for all F−i ∈ G−i.
Theorem 2. The following statements are equivalent.
(1) C (·) satisﬁes Axiom 1- Axiom 6.
(2) C (·) is based on the Marginality Principle.
Proof. That (2) implies (1) is easy to see. We shall prove the converse.
Part 1, Part 4 of Lemma 1 and Axiom 6 mean that i satisﬁes allows us
10to apply Lemma 6, Agastya (1996), which shows that it admits a utility
representation of the form
Ui (fi) =
X
S⊆Ni∪{d},S6=∅
q (S)fi (S)
for some set of weights {q (S)}S⊆Ni∪{d},S6=∅. Rewrite the above as
Ui (fi) = q ({d})fi ({d}) +
X
S⊆Ni,S6=∅
q (S ∪ {d})fi (S ∪ {d})
+
X
S⊆Ni,S6=∅
q (S)fi (S)
Given a fi, deﬁne f∗
i to be
f∗
i (S) =

 
 
0 if S = d
f (S) if d / ∈ S
f (S \ d) if d ∈ S
for S 6= ∅,S ⊆ Ni ∪ {d}
and note that
Ui (f∗
i ) =
X
S⊆Ni,S6=∅
q (S ∪ {d})fi (S)
+
X
S⊆Ni,S6=∅
q (S)fi (S)
Use Part 3, Lemma 1 to choose a normalization that Ui(·) is identically zero
on Ni. Since f∗
i ∈ Ni,
Ui (fi) = Ui (fi) − Ui (f∗
i )
= q ({d})fi ({d})
+
X
S⊆Ni,S6=∅
q (S ∪ {d})[fi (S ∪ {d}) − fi (S)]
Take pi (S) = q (S ∪ {d})/Ui (δ∗
i ) and
θi (fi) =
X
S⊆Ni
pi (S)[fi (S ∪ {d}) − fi (S)].
Apply Theorem 1 to complete the proof. 
113.1. Shapley Value As the Decision Criterion
The Shapley value of the DM in a SS fi is given by
Shi(fi,Ni) =
X
S⊆Ni
s!(ni − s + 1)!
(ni + 1)!
[fi(S ∪ d) − fi(S)] (10)
where s denotes the number of players in a coalition S. A particular instance
of a choice rule that obeys the marginality principle occurs when θi(·) ob-
tained in Theorem 2 is in fact Shi(·). We now introduce a further axiom by
which it will become unique.
Given Si ⊆ Ni and α, let Fα,Si denote the CS where fj = δ∗
j for j 6= i and
fi = αδSi∪{d}. When presented with Fα,Si, the DM can ensure a unit of
utility by choosing a j 6= i. If α < |S + 1| and the DM were to choose i,
there is an average of less than one unit to be split among any coalition
that might form in the SS fi. Despite this fact, if i ∈ C(F), then the DM
must expect get more than one “utile” by choosing i. We would then think
of her as an “optimist”. For similar considerations, we would regard her a
pessimist if she i / ∈ F∗
α,S when α ≥ |S + 1. For a DM that expresses neither
pessimism nor optimism, Axiom 1 would then imply C(F∗
α,S) = {1,...,m}
when α = (s + 1).
The following Axiom, which we shall use as a replacement for Axiom 1
combines the statement that the DM is neither an optimist nor a pessimist
together with the intuition expressed for Axiom 1.
Axiom 7 (Consistency). Given scalars αj ≥ 0 for j = 1,...,m, let F be a
CS where fj = αiδj if j 6= i and fi = αi(s + 1)δS∪d for some S ⊆ Ni. Then
j ∈ C(F) if and only if αj ≥ αj0 for all j,j0 ∈ {1,...,m}
Note that Axiom 7 implies Axiom 1 as a special case. This axiom gives the
following Shapley Value theorem.
Theorem 3. The following statements are equivalent
(1) C (·) satisﬁes Axiom 7, Axiom 2 - Axiom 6.
(2) For every F ∈ G, i ∈ C (F) if and only if Shi(fi) ≥ Shj(fj).
Proof. That (2) implies (1) is easy to see. We shall prove the converse.
Apply Theorem 2 and let θi (·) be as its proof. It is well known that for any
12S ⊆ Ni ∪ d, S 6= ∅,
Shi(δS) =



1
s if d ∈ S
0 otherwise
(11)
Moreover, it is well known that Bi = {δS : S ⊆ Ni ∪ {d}} is a basis for
R2Ni\{d}. Since θi (·) is linear, it suﬃces to show that θi (·) agrees with
Shi (·,Ni ∪ {d}) on Bi. To see this, note that θi(·) satisﬁes the marginality
principle and therefore θi(δS) = 0 for S ⊆ Ni is immediate. That θi(δS∪d) =
1/(s + 1) is also immediate since (s + 1)δS∪d ∼i δ∗
i and θi(δ∗
i ) = 1 by
Axiom 7. 
4. Discussion
It is possible to obtain some analogue of Theorem 1 under milder conditions.
We shall not pursue this here. Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 on the other
hand depend on very speciﬁc implications of Axiom 6 and Axiom 7 for
i. It should not be surprising that the marginality principle does not
hold by altering them. The remainder of this section is to suggest a slight
generalization of the marginality principle and how it might obtain if i can
reasonably be argued to be separable3 across coalitions.
Deﬁnition 4 (Marginality Principle∗). The choice rule C (·) is said to be
based on the marginality principle if for each i ∈ {1,...,m}, there exists
a sequence of functions {vS(·) : S ⊆ Ni,S 6= ∅} such that i ∈ C (F) ⇔
θi (fi) ≥ θj (fj) where
θi (fi) =
X
S⊆Ni
vS(fi(S ∪ {d})) − vS(fi(S)) (12)
and θi(·) is homogenous of degree one.
One could consider a wide variety of conditions that would render i sepa-
rable across coalitions. One way to think of such (equivalent) conditions is
as follows. Suppose at fi we change the productivity of exactly one coalition
S ⊆ Ni ∪ {d} by αS to get a SS fi,α. That is fi,αS(T) = fi(T) if T 6= S
and fi,αS(S) = fi(S) + αS for a scalar αS. If fi ∼i fi,αS then it must be
that the increase is not suﬃcient to improve the attractiveness of the group
i in response any F−i. That one coalition is independent of another can be
3A binary relation  on R
n is said to be separable if it admits a utility representation of
the form U(x1,...,xn) =
Pn
i=1 vi(xi) where (x1,...,xn) ∈ R
n where vi : R −→ R.
13captured by requiring that changing the productivity of coalitions other S
at fi and fi,αS has not eﬀect on this equivalence. The following makes this
precise.
Axiom 8 (Separability). Suppose fi ∼i fi,αS for some αS. Then f0
i ∼i f0
i,αS
for any other f0
i such that fi(S) = f0
i(S)
Proposition 1. Suppose Axiom 1-Axiom 5 and Axiom 8 hold. Then C(·)
is based on the Marginality Principle∗.
Proof. Label the coalitions in Ni ∪ {d} from 1 to k = 2ni+1 − 1. Fix any
set of indices J ⊆ {1,...,k} and let (x,z) ∈ Rk
+ be such that x = (xκ)κ∈J
and z = (zκ)κ∈Jc. Any (x,z) and (x,z0) correspond to some fi,f0
i ∈ Gi such
that fi (S) = fi;0 (S) for all S that correspond to the labels in J. Further,
upon repeated application, Axiom 7 is essentially the condition
(x,z) + (w,0) ∼i (x,z) ⇔
 
x,z0
+ (w,0) ∼i
 
x,z0
(13)
where (x,z),(x,z0),(x + w,z),(x + w,z0) ∈ Rk
+.
Recall i is said to satisfy order independence in the sense of Debreu (1960)
if for any J ⊆ {1,...,k} and for all (x,z),(y,z),(x,z0) and (y,z0) in Rk
+,
(y,z) ∼i (x,z) ⇔
 
y,z0
∼i
 
x,z0
(14)
Since Debreu (1960) it is well known that i admits a separable represen-
tation if and only if it is order independent. Therefore, it suﬃces to show
that (13) implies (14). But this can readily seen to be the case by expressing
(y,z) = (x,z) + (w,0) and (y,z0) = (x,z0) + (w,0) and choosing w = y − x.
Therefore, there exists a utility representation U (·) of i of the form
U (x1,...,xk) =
k X
κ=1
vκ (xκ)
Now mimic the proof of Theorem 2 to show that the Marginality Principle*
is satisﬁed. 
Conclusion. This paper is motivated by a desire to understand how peo-
ple make choices among strategic situations when the rules of play are not
precise. Theorem 1 showed how standard “utility theory” can be brought
to bear on the problem. Through a further examination of the “utility of
playing a game”, we have oﬀerred additional insights for using the Shapley
Value as a decision rule for making choices in such environments.
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